GreatFire July

News Sites Update

After Bloomberg was blocked in June, we are tracking whether other news websites will follow with great interest. Of particular interest is - the Chinese version of the New York Times which was also launched in June. It has not yet been blocked. The Hong Kong edition of Yahoo! News was less lucky. was blocked on July 3 and has stayed inaccessible in China since. Yahoo! China (, which is hosted in China and operates under Chinese censorship regulations, is still working well though.

Bye-bye Slideshare was blocked on July 11 and has stayed blocked since. This is the first time that Slideshare has been permantently blocked since we started monitoring access to it from China in March, 2011.

High-Profile Censorship On Weibo

任志强 , CEO of one of the largest real estate company in China, member of the CPPCC (Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference) and a Weibo profile with 9 million followers had his account temporarily blocked after posting tweets about the Beijing floods. He was unblocked shortly after. Less lucky was the US Consulate in Shanghai whose Weibo account was permanently shut down (full story). 

Censored Video Games

Some insiders reported on Baidu that video games without a special license from Chinese authority will be taken down from any website. The original story has since been deleted but a copy is shown here to the right. The game Political Machine 2008 was blocked on Weibo (weibo: 政治机器2008) though the similar terms weibo: 政治机器 and weibo: 政治机器2012 were not. We can't wait for the day the Chinese polical power struggles become a video game too.

Additionally, the online marketplace Taobao added to the censorship by not allowing any searches for the game Diablo (暗黑3暗黑破坏神diablo). Unlike the likes of Sina Weibo and Baidu, though, they don't admit to censoring but instead only display a message that nothing could be found.

More Glitches In The System

At around 11:00 pm on July 16 and 10:30 pm on July 31, the Great Firewall stopped some of its so called DNS poisoning. On both occasions, the DNS poisoning was back within a few hours. But for the duration of the incidents, it was possible to get correct IP addresses for high-profile blocked websites such as and Most would still be inaccessible, though, since they are also blocked by IP addresses and by keyword filtering.

Another incident was that China Telecom users were unable to access any foreign websites from about 10:20 am to 10:40 am on July 27. Other ISPs such as China Unicom did not seem to be affected. This follows a similar outage in April this year, though this time it lasted for a shorter time period. Also it seemed to be more complete this time around, seemingly blocking all types of traffic to foreign servers.

Keywords Blocked

These keywords were not blocked in China before July 2012. From sometime in July and onwards, they have all been blocked. A total of 15 new keywords that we track were blocked in July, which compares to 231 keywords that were blocked in June.

  1. google: bloomberg
  2. google: 买通gov做靠山
  3. weibo: chen xi
  4. weibo: dafengqixi
  5. weibo: guo boxiong
  6. weibo: xijingping
  7. weibo: xizang
  8. weibo: 晚自习后
  9. weibo: 胡77
  10. weibo: 胡佳_(社活動家)
  11. weibo: 胡萝卜
  12. weibo: 警车被掀翻
  13. weibo: 阿扁对小胡
  14. weibo: 黄海ci胡

Keywords Unblocked

These keywords were all blocked in China before July 2012. From sometime in July and onwards, they have all been unblocked. A total of 42 keywords that we track were unblocked in July, which compares to 24 keywords that were unblocked in June. 20 of them contain the number 64, which is a reference to the June 4 massacre of 1989. It indicates that any mentioning of that event was deemed particularly sensitive around the time of the anniversary.

  1. weibo: 426社论
  2. weibo: 6420
  3. weibo: 64之 后
  4. weibo: 64之后
  5. weibo: 64之役
  6. weibo: 64二十周年
  7. weibo: 64历史
  8. weibo: 64历史
  9. weibo: 64平反
  10. weibo: 64式手枪
  11. weibo: 64手抢
  12. weibo: 64手枪
  13. weibo: 64旁见
  14. weibo: 64死难
  15. weibo: 64母亲
  16. weibo: 64真像
  17. weibo: 64纪念
  18. weibo: 64血案
  19. weibo: 64血腥
  20. weibo: 64诗集
  21. weibo: 64遇难
  22. weibo: GC党
  23. weibo: bbc
  24. weibo: gongchan当
  25. weibo: gongchan挡
  26. weibo: renquan
  27. weibo: ren权
  28. weibo: 丁关根
  29. weibo: 党下台
  30. weibo: 八大
  31. weibo: 占领重庆
  32. weibo: 发票代理
  33. weibo: 夜袭珍珠港美人受惊
  34. weibo: 宗教 迫害
  35. weibo: 暴动
  36. weibo: 朝鲜+兵变
  37. weibo: 枪声
  38. weibo: 法会
  39. weibo: 猥亵
  40. weibo: 盲人
  41. weibo: 纪念64
  42. weibo: 自焚

Foreign Websites Getting Faster

When we started monitoring websites in March, 2011, the average download speed of an Alexa Top 500 website not hosted in China was less than 13 kilobytes per second. As you can see in this graph, since then it's steadily increased and now stands at almost 18 kilobytes per second. This is still slow of course, but at least it's going in the right direction. Here's the source data.

Loading chart..


More Blog Posts

Subscribe to our mailing list
Show content from Blog | Google+ | Twitter | All. Subscribe to our blog using RSS.

Thu, Sep 24, 2015

Apple blocked CNNIC CA months after MITM attacks

In March of this year, Google found unauthorized digital certificates for several Google domains. The root certificate authority for these domains was the China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC). CNNIC was controlled by the Chinese government through the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and is now under the management of the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC). CNNIC was recognized by all major browsers as a trusted Certificate Authority. If CNNIC signs a fake certificate used in a man-in-the-middle attack, no browser will warn of any unusual activity unless the certificate is pinned.

Wed, Sep 23, 2015

Malicious Xcode could spread via download manager Xunlei

What’s at stake?

We reported last week that popular Chinese iOS apps were compromised in an unprecedented malware attack. We discovered that the source of the infection was compromised copies of Xcode hosted on Baidu Pan. Apple has published an article urging developers to download Xcode directly from the Mac App Store, or from the Apple Developer website and validate signatures. We’ve now discovered that even if a developer uses a download link seemingly from Apple, he might still be possible to obtain a compromised copy of Xcode.

Please note that we do not have evidence that such attacks has happened. But it is an easy attack that anyone can implement.

How does it work?

This compromise happened because of Xunlei. Xunlei is the most popular download manager in China. Much of its popularity is due to the fact they can accelerate download speeds by pulling resources from other Xunlei users as well as cached copies on the Xunlei server. All of this, however, is invisible to users. Users can simply enter a regular http download address into Xunlei  download manager and the download will start. Chinese developers were using direct download addresses such as to download Xcode.

Mon, Sep 21, 2015



Sat, Sep 19, 2015

Popular Chinese iOS apps compromised in unprecedented malware attack

What happened?

According to recent reports, some versions of Xcode used by developers in China have been compromised and are being used to inject tracking codes in iOS apps without developer knowledge. (1,2). Unaware of the injection, those developers then released their compromised iOS apps to the App Store which were then later approved by Apple. At the time of writing this post, the compromised apps are still available in the App store. Any user who has installed and launched these compromised apps will be a victim of these tracking codes.

This is a significant compromise of Apple’s app store. Apple notoriously manually reviews all app submissions and, in comparison to Android stores, has been relatively malware-free. This is the most widespread and significant spread of malware in the history of the Apple app store, anywhere in the world.

The compromised version of Xcode was hosted on Baidu Pan. It is unlikely that Baidu was aware of the compromised version of Xcode. The company removed the files yesterday when news of the compromise surfaced. Because of slow download speeds from foreign websites in China, many Chinese developers prefer to download apps from domestic websites. Many Chinese also use download software like Xunlei, rather than downloading directly from the official Mac App Store.

According to users reports, many prominent Chinese apps are affected. We have included links to the compromised apps in the list below but DO NOT DOWNLOAD these apps. We are simply linking to them so that users can recognize the apps. Affected apps include:  

Wechat The most popolar messaging app in China 

Wed, Sep 16, 2015



Roya, David, Nick, nweaver, Vern, 和我刚刚完成了关于GFW主动探测系统的研究。这个系统在几年前就被用来探测翻墙工具,比如Tor。我们在之前的博文中介绍过GFW主动探测系统是如何工作的。但有几个问题我们没有回答。比如这个系统的物理结构是怎样的。那些用来主动探测的IP是归GFW所有的么? 有猜测GFW短时间内劫持了部分IP来用来主动探测,但没有证据。这次研究回答了这些问题。


  • 通常来说,如果Tor的某个网桥代理被GFW检测并封锁,它会一直被封锁。但是这意味着网桥代理完全无法访问吗? 我们让中国的VPS一直连接我们控制的网桥代理。我们发现,每25小时,中国的VPS可以短暂的连接到我们的代理网桥。下图显示了这个现象。每个数据点表示中国的VPS试图与网桥代理建立连接。中国联通和中国教育网都有这个周期性现象。有时候,网络安全设备在更新规则时会默认允许所有流量,但我们不知道GFW周期性现象是不是因为这个原因导致的。

  • 我们找到了规律,GFW主动探测的TCP头暗示那几千个IP都来自与同一个地方。下图显示了数据包的初始序号和时间。每个数据点都是一个主动探测连接。如果每个主动探测都是从不同地方发出的,我们应该看到随机的数据点,因为数据包的初始序号是随机选择的。但是下图显示主动探测连接虽然来自不同IP,但是非常有规律。我们认为主动探测的初始序号是按照时间产生的。


Subscribe to our blog using RSS.


this post is awesome, great msg for us, plz update ur blog for daily basis, i am regular visitor of this site, so keep posting for us,

click the below links to create backlink
best free backlink website
click here for msg movie

Add new comment

Filtered HTML

  • Web page addresses and e-mail addresses turn into links automatically.
  • Allowed HTML tags: <a> <em> <strong> <cite> <blockquote> <code> <ul> <ol> <li> <dl> <dt> <dd>
  • Lines and paragraphs break automatically.

Plain text

  • No HTML tags allowed.
  • Web page addresses and e-mail addresses turn into links automatically.
  • Lines and paragraphs break automatically.
By submitting this form, you accept the Mollom privacy policy.